

BAIL AND SENTENCE REFORM ESSAYS

By

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A BROKEN “SYSTEM”

*Exploiting yet another break, a parolee absconds.
He wounds three police officers, and society shrugs.*



For Police Issues by Julius (Jay) Wachtel. We’re not privy to juvenile records. So all we can say is that the first significant criminal action against Jonathan Magana took place just a few months after his eighteenth birthday, when the Los Angeles resident was arrested for armed robbery. Two months later, after pleading “nolo” to a felony, the young adult drew a year in county jail and five years’ probation. As a felon, he became forbidden from ever having guns or ammunition.

That’s the first entry in the table. Alas, Mr. Magana’s first adult brush with the law apparently had little effect. Our search of L.A. County Superior Court records reveals that he enjoyed quite the criminal career:

Arrest	Charge	Plea	Sent. date	Sentence
2/6/09	Armed robbery	Nolo	4/28/09	One year county jail, five years formal Probation.
12/17/09	Hit-and-run, no driver license	Nolo	10/25/10	Three years probation for ct. I, two years for ct. II, plus brief jail term or small fine.
5/1/11	Felon with ammunition, no driver lic.	Guilty	5/11/11	32 months prison (driving charge dismissed).
8/31/13	Felon with a firearm	Nolo	2/28/14	One year county jail, three years formal probation.
9/14/14	Possess control. subs.	Guilty	4/2/15	Forty days jail, two years summary Probation.

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10/27/19	Armed robbery (2 cts.), att. robbery (1 ct.)	Guilty	2/4/20	Four years prison ct. I; one year ct. II. Att. robbery dismissed.
10/5/22 10/6/22	Battery on a peace officer; felon with a firearm; parole viol.			10/21/22 posted bail; 2/2/23 warrants issued for failure to appear

Punishment-wise, Mr. Magana always got a break. And except for a gap following his 2014 arrest, he was always convicted on new charges well before his existing sentence (had it run its full course) would have expired:

- In December 2009, less than eight months after drawing a year for armed robbery, Mr. Magana was arrested for hit-and-run and unlicensed driving. He got a slap on the wrist.
- In August 2013, less than twenty-eight months after getting thirty-two months for having ammunition, Mr. Magana was caught with a gun. That earned him county jail time and probation.
- In October 2022, thirty-two months after being sentenced to two prison terms for two robberies – one for four-years, another for one year – Mr. Magana was again caught with a gun. He also battered a cop.

Now facing a parole violation, Mr. Magana knew that he had run out of wiggle room. It might have been anticipated that he wouldn't show for arraignment. Yet he was allowed to post bail. Five weeks later, on March 8, LAPD officers spotted the fugitive. [He ducked into a residence](#). Police ordered him to come out, but he refused. So a K-9 team went in. Mr. Magana responded with gunfire.

Three officers were wounded, fortunately none critically.

SWAT took over and sent in a robot. Mr. Magana's body was hauled out later that night. He had committed suicide.

As one might imagine, "three officers shot" dominated the broadcast news. But when we turned to our main go-to source for happenings in Southern California, the *Los Angeles Times*, their coverage seemed to lack its usual depth. Click [here](#) for the first

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piece, and [here](#) for the second. Three days after the shooting, [its weekly “The Week in Photos” feature](#) was prominently tagged “A brutal killing devastates a family; meanwhile, California braces for flooding”. That “family” was unrelated to the officers’ shooting. As for the cops, their tragedy was accorded one measly picture, and it could only be reached after considerable scrolling. It depicts a patrol officer placing a flare on the roadway.

Fortunately, other news outlets proved quite informative. [A detailed account](#) by the *Associated Press* featured some telling comments from the board of the L.A. police officers’ union:

Although we believe they will recover physically, each of these officers will live with the memory of almost losing their lives at the hands of a wanted fugitive in a hail of gunfire. What occurred last night to these Metropolitan Division K-9 officers happens all too often to law enforcement officers and is a stark reminder of the inherent danger every officer faces when they put on their uniform each day.

KTLA, a local television station, [posted a print version](#) of its comprehensive on-air coverage. After exploring Mr. Magana’s criminal past and the breaks he got in some detail, it conveyed the heartfelt comments of L.A. Mayor Karen Bass, who spoke with two of the officers in the hospital:

I think that it was just important for me to be here. This is a place that is familiar to me. I used to work here in the emergency room, in trauma, and so to go back to the emergency room now to try to bring comfort and support to officers was something that was very important and meaningful to me...It is worth repeating that we must do much, much more to protect our officers and protect our communities.

To be fair, the *Times* did (briefly) allude to Mr. Magana’s criminal career. But its coverage was far less informative than what we found elsewhere. Say, [in the Washington Times](#). Its detailed account was descriptively entitled “Another felon released early from prison shot three police officers in Los Angeles.”

Alas, many such encounters have produced tragically lethal endings. Here are four recent Southern California examples (see updates to [“Catch and Release”](#)):



Michael Paredes

Joseph Santana

Isaiah Cordero

Gonzalo Carrasco Jr.

- On June 14, 2022, [a multi-convicted felon](#) shot and killed El Monte, Calif. police officers Michael Paredes and Joseph Santana as they responded to a domestic violence call. Justin Flores wouldn't have been running loose had progressive L.A. District Attorney George Gascon not barred his deputies from using sentencing enhancements. Instead, the known gang member was back on the streets after serving twenty days for felon with a gun.
- On December 1, 2022 [a multi-convicted felon](#) shot and killed Riverside County (Calif.) Deputy Isaiah Cordero during a traffic stop. Two months earlier William Shea McKay was convicted of crimes including false imprisonment and evading police. But a judge released him on bail and repeatedly postponed sentencing. Police later shot McKay dead. To the *Times'* credit, it published a piece that deeply probed McKay's criminal past. It was entitled "Why a three-strikes felon — on bail twice over — was on the streets, where he gunned down a deputy."
- On January 31, 2023 [a 23-year old ex-con](#) shot and killed Selma, California police officer Gonzalo Carrasco Jr. Officer Carrasco, who had two years on the job, encountered Nathaniel Dixon on a suspicious person call. Dixon had served a brief prison term for robbery. Once released he accumulated a series of gun and drug convictions. But thanks to [a considerate plea deal](#) and California's "Public Safety Realignment Act" (see below) he was on probation.



“[Cause and Effect](#)” traced California’s easing of punishment to September 2010, when then-Governor Schwarzenegger [signed a bill](#) raising the threshold for felony Grand Theft from \$400 to \$950. One year later came the “[Public Safety Realignment Act](#)”, which redirected “non-serious, non-violent” offenders from state prison to county jail. In 2014 [Proposition 47](#) reclassified all thefts where losses don’t exceed \$950 (including break-ins formerly treated as burglaries) to misdemeanors. Two years later came the alluringly entitled “[Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act](#)”, which directed that persons convicted of non-violent crimes be paroled after completing their primary term, regardless of other charges or sentence enhancements. And in 2022, [AB 2361](#) forbid transferring minors to adult court without proof that they couldn’t be rehabilitated if treated as juveniles.



Progressive places are likely to “realign” until the proverbial cows come home. But coupling high-sounding concepts such as “realignment” and “rehabilitation” with “public safety” overlooks a chronic problem. According to a September 2021 BJS report, “[Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 24 States in 2008](#)”, 81.9 percent of the members of this population of releasees was rearrested within ten years; 39.6 percent for a violent crime and 47.4 percent for a property crime (Table 11). And when rearrested, those who had been imprisoned for a violent crime were somewhat more likely than property offenders to be charged with a violent offense (44.2% v. 39.7%).

What’s more, the length of prison terms proved important (Table 14). Inmates who served sentences longer than the median (15 months) were less likely to be rearrested within ten years (75.5% v. 81.1%). That was particularly so for those who had been convicted of a violent crime. For this group, 78.3 percent who served terms less than the 29-month median were arrested within ten years of release. That dropped to 66.4 percent for inmates whose sentences had exceeded the median, a statistically significant difference.

Still, as in virtually every other aspect of public policy, ideology rules. One day before Mr. Magana wounded the three officers, the Los Angeles city council [put off a decision](#) on whether to accept a \$280,000 gift to acquire an advanced robotic dog. Although its donor, the LAPD Foundation, assured lawmakers that the newfangled

creature “would allow authorities to avoid unnecessarily putting officers in harm’s way and potentially avoid violent encounters,” protesters argued that its true purpose was to help cops spy on minorities.

Your blogger is no fan of harsh policing. Nor of harsh punishment (see, for example, [“Tookie’s Fate”](#) and [“Lock’Em Up”](#)). But what he learned during a law enforcement career makes him reluctant to endorse get-out-of-jail-free cards. As the [BJS report](#) mentioned on its very first page, “about 61% of prisoners released in 2008 returned to prison within 10 years for a parole or probation violation or a new sentence.” Still, convicted persons can’t be locked up forever. While officers Paredes, Santana, Cordero and Carrasco would have certainly benefited had their assailants remained in custody, long prison terms provoke liberty concerns and are *very* expensive. At some point inmates *must* be let go.

So what *could* help? Progressively-minded California has a couple of intriguing approaches. At the state prison in Lancaster, an [“Offender Mentor Certification Program”](#) trains prisoners as alcohol and drug addiction counselors. Its intense eighteen-month program, which includes an lengthy, hands-on internship, has enabled many former inmates to secure related positions after release. And in a [brand-new effort](#), Governor Gavin Newsom announced a re-do of infamous San Quentin prison –



California’s oldest lockup and the home of its only death row (he halted its use in 2019). Based on a Scandinavian model, the “Big Q” will focus on rehabilitation, education and training. California’s re-do ([it’s already in place](#) at SCI Chester, a Pennsylvania prison) has drawn interest [from across the U.S.](#)

Yet for now, when it comes to punishment, the criminal justice “system” is clearly broken. Whether their disputes reflect differences in ideology or perspective, judges, prosecutors, cops and corrections officials can’t seem to agree on basics such as length of confinement, terms of release, and what to do when efforts to give someone a “break” don’t work. And it’s not just cops who suffer the consequences. So until “Little Scandinavia” (that’s what they call SCI Chester) becomes a universal reality, perhaps we ought to encourage everyone who participates in that imperfect “system” to take a deep read of that sobering BJS report.

It couldn’t hurt.

Posted 12/18/11

CATCH AND RELEASE

Sometimes there really is no substitute for common sense

By Julius (Jay) Wachtel. “If you’re talking about somebody who the rap sheet in front of you shows is potentially a dangerous person, has a gun, has a criminal history, common sense says don’t let him out until you make one phone call.” New York City [Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s criticism](#) was directed at Evelyn Laporte, a Brooklyn judge who had brushed aside a prosecutor’s request to set \$2,500 bail and released a man arrested on drug possession and child endangerment charges on his own recognizance.

Yet the suspect, Lamont Pride, 27, [wasn’t an unknown quantity](#). Officers had caught him packing a knife a couple months earlier, a tangle that cost Pride a day in jail. Authorities in Pride’s home town, Greensboro, North Carolina had [recently secured felony warrants](#) accusing Pride of shooting a man in the foot as they quarreled over a woman. Pride, who allegedly used a .22 pistol, was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict serious injury, felony conspiracy, and possession of a firearm by a felon, the latter relating to a prior conviction for armed robbery, an offense for which he served 13 months in prison.

Now here’s the part that’s hard to swallow. Greensboro’s warrants [specified “in-state extradition only.”](#) Police and prosecutors would later explain that they didn’t consider Pride a flight risk and thought “he could still be in the area.” So why not authorize extradition? One can guess that in these times of strapped budgets there were second thoughts about sending officers to another state to bring back a local ne’er-do well, particularly if injuries, as in this case, were minor and the victim was no one special.

The story doesn’t end there. When NYPD arrested Pride for drugs and child endangerment an officer called Greensboro PD to confirm that they wouldn’t extradite. That fact was passed on to Judge Laporte, who also got a look-see at Pride’s long rap sheet. But she O.R.’d him anyway. Still, NYPD wasn’t done. A detective called Greensboro a few days later. Whatever transpired during that little chat clearly had an impact, and on November 8 North Carolina’s warrant was amended to authorize extradition.

Alas, it was too late. Pride skipped his New York City court appearance and was nowhere to be found. On December 12, NYPD officer Peter J. Figoski, 47, a 22-year veteran and father of four, [responded to a report of a residential armed robbery](#). (It turned out to be a vicious attempt to rip off a local drug dealer.) While searching a dark

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apartment building officer Figoski and his partner were surprised by Pride, who allegedly pulled a 9mm. pistol and shot Figoski dead. Pride was caught during a foot chase.

Felons on the lam are always dangerous. On June 29, 2010 Dontae Morris allegedly [shot and killed Tampa police officers David Curtis \(I\) and Jeffrey Kocab](#) during a traffic stop. Morris, whose record includes arrests (but not convictions) for murder and weapons violations was released from prison two months earlier after serving a two-year term for possession and sale of cocaine. Only thing is, Morris had an active felony warrant for bad checks. “Right now we’re not going to start pointing the fingers of blame,” said Tampa PD Chief Jane Castor. “And frankly, it’s not going to bring the officers back.”

The deaths of officers Curtis and Kocab have been attributed to a complex tangle of bad decisions. Equally lethal results can flow from simple paperwork blunders. On January 23, 2011 “low-risk” parolee Thomas Hardy, 60, [shot Indianapolis police officer David Moore](#) during a traffic stop. Hardy was arrested after robbing a convenience store an hour later. Actually, Hardy shouldn’t have been on the street in the first place, as he had recently been arrested for felony theft. Regrettably, Hardy’s parole status hadn’t been entered into the computer, and he didn’t tell, so he was let go after arraignment.

Officer Moore succumbed to his injuries. Both his parents were cops. His father was a retired Lieutenant, his mother an active-duty Sergeant.

We’ve suggested in the past that bad decisions can be often attributed to a tendency to “dismiss, dismiss, dismiss.” Going to “extraordinary lengths to routinize information and interpret questionable behavior in its most favorable light” can have tragic consequences. Here are a few examples:

- Perhaps fearing that they might be branded as bigots, military authorities repeatedly ignored warning signs about [the radicalization of Nidal Hasan](#), the Army major who killed eighteen and wounded twenty-eight at Fort Hood.
- A lack of regulatory will and Federal law enforcement resources were clearly at work in the case of [Bernie Madoff](#), the record-breaking Ponzi artist whose decades-long scheme cost victims billions.
- Parolee [Phillip Garrido](#) enjoyed so much slack while under supervision that he was able to kidnap a young woman and, with help from his wife, confine her to a backyard pen for eighteen years as his sex slave.

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- After doing fifteen years for rape, Cleveland serial killer [Anthony Sowell](#) was ignored by police despite a string of odd and violent goings-on at his home involving various women, including one who supposedly “fell” from a window.
- And who could forget would-be underwear bomber [Umar Abdulmutallab](#), a self-made Nigerian terrorist whom American consular and intelligence authorities failed to place on the do-not fly list even after Umar’s father warned them that his radicalized kid was up to no good.

When funding is tight criminal justice agencies must economize. And yes, there are consequences. States have been granting early paroles by the bucketful, releasing inmates left and right to make room and save money. Yet predicting someone’s threat to society is chancy. In August [three top Wisconsin juvenile corrections officials were suspended](#) after police arrested three Milwaukee teens for a vicious robbery-murder. Two had been granted early releases while serving terms for violent crimes. One, now 18, did less than three years for directing a killing in which his adult codefendants got twenty years.

Decisions that can let potentially dangerous individuals go free should be taken in a reflective atmosphere with sufficient time to gather and evaluate all pertinent information. In the efficiency-obsessed atmosphere that pervades today’s criminal justice system that ideal is rarely reached. Pressures to economize can lead well-intentioned practitioners such as Judge Laporte to lose their way and forget why they’re there. It’s precisely for such reasons that Mayor Bloomberg’s admonition to use “common sense” should be taken to heart. Officers Figoski, Curtis, Kocab and Moore would ask for nothing less.

Posted 2/5/12

CATCH AND RELEASE (PART II)

An “evidence-based” pre-trial release program lands Milwaukee in a pickle

By Julius (Jay) Wachtel. Ever since NIJ adopted the “evidence-based” mantra it’s been *de rigueur* for governments at all levels to demand solutions that are founded in science and empirically verifiable. But in criminal justice, where it’s often hard to say what factors to consider in the first place, let alone how to measure their effects, thoughtlessly crunching data is risky.

For an example look no further than Milwaukee’s brand-new pretrial release program. Developed by Justice 2000, a small Milwaukee nonprofit founded in 2001 to promote the “safe release and community integration of criminal offenders,” it applies a set of measures to estimate the likelihood that a defendant might fail to appear or reoffend. Staff members collect information about the nature of the offense, criminal record, previous failures to appear, drug and alcohol use, mental impairment, community bonds and family ties from official records and personal interviews. Results are computed and furnished to a court commissioner who makes the final decision about bail and release.

Justice 2000’s director says that its protocol is based on a study of two years’ worth of release data, and that everything is done impartially. “We’re neutral, just supplying information and applying the tool.”

It’s not the first time that Justice 2000 has provided pretrial services. In 2003 it took over the city’s “Municipal Court Alternatives Program,” which offers persons cited for minor transgressions community service, drug treatment and counseling as alternatives to jail and fines. In 2004 the main outcome metric, fewer jail days, was 13,288, saving the city \$531,520 in housing costs.

Justice 2000’s new program is different. Just how different was apparent a few days ago when authorities announced that Derrick Byrd was returned to custody after a commissioner acting on Justice 2000’s recommendation released him on his own recognizance. What was the original charge? Robbery-murder.

Yes, that’s right: Milwaukee O.R.’d an accused murderer. Stunned prosecutors (they had asked for a \$150,000 cash bond) rushed to a judge, who looked things over and set bail at \$50,000. By then Byrd was gone, but he surrendered after checking in with

Justice 2000 staff. His bail is now \$30,000, which he still can't pay. Incidentally, there's no doubt that he was involved in the crime, the murder last October of the owner of a recycling business. According to [a sketchy account](#), Byrd admitted that he participated in planning the heist but says that someone else pulled the trigger. Byrd reportedly has no prior criminal record and his lawyer says that he is willing to cooperate and point the finger at the real shooter.

Justice 2000's program has been in effect only since mid-January. Amazingly, Byrd isn't the only accused killer whom its staff has recommended for kid-gloves treatment. On January 24 police arrested [Chasity Lewis, 18](#), for reckless homicide. An admitted marijuana dealer, she told police that three boys tried to take drugs without paying and that one punched her. Doing what comes natural, she pulled a .22 pistol that she carried for protection and shot her assailant, a 16-year old boy, point-blank in the chest. Based on her lack of a prior record, school attendance and "steady home life," Justice 2000 recommended O.R. But for blowback from the Byrd case, she would have gotten it. (Instead, a commissioner set bail at \$20,000. Lewis remains in custody.)

All pre-trial release schemes are subject to two types of error. "Type 1" errors of overestimation (also referred to as false positives) lead to the detention of persons who would not have fled or committed another crime. "Type 2" errors of failure to include (also referred to as false negatives) cause the release of those who will likely flee or recidivate. According to Milwaukee County Sheriff David A. Clarke, Justice 2000's protocol seems purposely biased in favor of the accused. "There's a use for pretrial screening, but obviously this tool needs to be recalibrated," said Clarke, who suggested that "evidence-based decision making" and promises of saving money are sweeteners offered by those with a secret liberal agenda.

Politics aside, it may be that when it comes to murder, trying to strike the usual cost-benefit, Type 1/Type 2 balance doesn't work. When Justice 2000 played in the sandbox of municipal court the consequences of being wrong (i.e., Type 2 errors) were minimal. In general criminal court, though, releases carry far weightier implications. Predicting recidivism is a frustratingly inexact science. As we pointed out in "[Reform and Blowback](#)," when a dangerous someone is let go and maims or kills, there's no trying to explain why they were released.

Bottom line: releasing shooters on their own recognizance is a huge step into the unknown. It's a new, quantum world, with hazy parameters and unpredictable consequences.

Well, maybe not all *that* unpredictable. In "[Risky Business](#)" we discussed the dangers of chasing after defendants who go on the lam. Warrant service is an extremely

dangerous business that all-too frequently leads to shootouts and dead cops. Of course, officers serving warrants are at least forewarned. Imagine what can happen when patrol officers inadvertently come across a dangerous wanted person. “[Catch and Release](#)” featured two such examples:

- In December 2011 Lamont Pride, a robber wanted for a shooting in North Carolina, [shot and killed NYPD officer Peter J. Figoski](#). Pride had been arrested by NYPD twice in recent months, most recently on a drug charge for which he failed to appear. He was released on low bail both times because the North Carolina warrant didn’t authorize extradition.
- In June 2010 Dontae Morris, a felon with arrests for murder and weapons violations, [shot and killed Tampa police officers David Curtis and Jeffrey Kocab](#) during a traffic stop. Morris, who had been recently released from a prison term for sale of cocaine, had an active warrant for bad checks.

Just how Milwaukee came to endorse release practices that could lead to O.R.’s for murder suspects will be fodder for discussion for years to come. Partnering with what clearly seems to be an advocacy group (in 2010 Justice 2000 merged with [Community Advocates](#)) may have been imprudent. Budget-conscious county officials might have been seduced with promises of cost savings and freeing up bed space. Perhaps the appeal of an “evidence-based” based strategy was too hard to resist.

But don’t just trust *Police Issues*. It’s been a year since Malcolm K. Sparrow’s superb [research article](#) cautioned against assuming that “evidence-based” approaches can yield practicable solutions to the real-life dilemmas encountered by police. Those that prove useful, he said, tend to be rebranded variants of what cops have already done. Dr. Sparrow counseled academics to heed the advice of practitioners, as they’re the real experts at the game. Last May [judges in St. Louis, Missouri](#) took that notion to heart. Sick and tired of gun violence, they started setting \$30,000 bail, full amount cash only, on everyone caught illegally packing guns. No surprise, most remained locked up. Homicides promptly began to drop, and the year ended with 114, 20 percent less than in 2010 and the fewest since 2004. Researchers now studying the program think that it holds special promise.

Milwaukee, meet St. Louis.

Posted 12/6/21

CAUSE AND EFFECT

***California eased up on punishing theft.
Did it increase crime? Embolden thieves?***



For Police Issues by Julius (Jay) Wachtel. Believe it or not, Jerry Brown got his start as a law-and-order type. In 1976, only a year into his first term as Governor, California's former Secretary of State [signed a bill](#) replacing the state's forgiving, indeterminate sentencing structure with tough-on-crime policies that prioritized punishment.

Of course, considering the "crime wave" [that beset the era](#), his move was likely inevitable. As were the consequences. In time the state's prisons became appallingly packed, creating insufferable conditions for inmates and guards alike. It took more than three decades, but in 2011 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed [a 2009 ruling](#) by a special three-judge panel ordering the release of more than thirty-thousand inmates.

At the time that the Supremes issued their slap-down, the Yale law school grad had just completed a four-year term as State Attorney General, and his second eight-year stint as Governor was underway. Despite his earlier leanings, Brown quickly fell in line with the new, less punitive approach, and during his term he would sign a host of measures reflecting California's new normal. But we'll begin our review with a law that was placed into effect by that famous "Red" politician whom Jerry Brown replaced.


- [Assembly Bill 2372](#). In September 2010, outgoing Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed a bill raising the threshold for the felony crime of Grand Theft from \$400 to \$950. Most other thefts became misdemeanors.
- [Assembly Bill 109](#). In 2011, shortly after the Supreme Court upheld the prisoner cap, Governor Brown signed the "Public Safety Realignment Act." Under its provisions, "non-serious, non-violent" offenders would serve their time in county jails instead of state prison. Generous good-time credits were thrown into the

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mix. During 2010-2012 California's combined jail/prison population [reportedly fell by more than twenty-thousand](#).

- [Proposition 47](#). Signed into law in November 2014, the enticingly (some would say, misleadingly) entitled "Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act" created the new offense of "shoplifting," a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months imprisonment. It applied to all thefts from businesses, including those planned in advance, as long as losses did not exceed \$950. Since then "shoplifting" has kept most planned thefts from being charged, as was once customary, [as felony burglary](#), as that requires entry with the intent to commit "grand or petit larceny or any felony."
- [Proposition 57](#). Effective November 2016, the alluringly entitled "Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act" allows non-violent felons to be considered for parole upon completion of the term for their main offense, regardless of other crimes for which they were convicted or any sentence enhancements that may have been imposed.

Progressives have championed Jerry Brown's legacy. Although the *Los Angeles Times* acknowledged in 2018 that there had been ["spikes" in violent and property crime](#) in the years following the enactment of AB 109 and Proposition 47, when the life-long servant finally, finally left public office it nonetheless applauded his decision [to "change course."](#)




Concerns about the potentially criminogenic effect of the Golden State's new, go-easy approach have received considerable scrutiny, academic and otherwise. Before getting into the studies, though, we thought it best to present [relevant data from the FBI](#). Our graphs depict property and violent crime rates per 100,000 population for California and the U.S. between 2010-2020.

California and national crime trends seem mostly in sync. But there are a few exceptions. First, as to property crimes. Assembly Bill 109, the "prison cap," slashed prison terms and transferred inmates to

local custody and supervision. It went into effect in 2011. During the following year property crime spiked 6.8% (2583.8 to 2758.7). Proposition 47, which created the offense of “shoplifting,” became State law in late 2014. By the end of 2015 property crime was up 7.3% (2441.1 to 2618.3). Its largest component, larceny-theft, increased 9.8 percent (1527.4 to 1677.1).

Shifting our attention to violent crime, in 2014 California’s rate was at a decade-low 396.1. Three years later, following the enactment of Propositions 47 and 57, it reached a decade-high 449.3, an increase of 13.4 percent.



How have experts interpreted these numbers? In “[The Effects of Changing Felony Theft Thresholds](#)” (2017) the Pew

Charitable Trust reported that twenty four of thirty States that raised the felony theft threshold during 2010-2012 enjoyed lower property crime rates in 2015 (California, which passed AB 2372 in 2010, was one of six exceptions.) While the Trust conceded that rates in the twenty States that *didn’t* change their threshold wound up even lower, the difference was not considered “statistically significant.”

Let’s skip forward to Proposition 47. Here are three prominent data-rich reports:

- According to the [Public Policy Institute of California](#), there is “some evidence” that Prop. 47 caused the 2014-2015 increase in larceny-theft. Rearrests and reconvictions for this crime also substantially declined (10.3 and 11.3 percent, respectively).
- An NSF-funded study, “[Impacts of California Proposition 47 on crime in Santa Monica, California](#),” found that thefts fitting the definition of “shoplifting” increased about fifteen percent in Santa Monica after the measure went into effect. Other crimes fell about nine percent. According to the authors, the surge could have been caused by the easing of punishment. Increased awareness might have also led to more reporting.

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- In “[Can We Downsize Our Prisons and Jails Without Compromising Public Safety?](#)”, two clearly reform-minded researchers conceded that larcenies and motor vehicle thefts seemed to increase after Prop. 47 went into effect. So [they generated a statistical comparison group](#) that estimated how many thefts would have occurred had the law *not* changed. They concluded that the difference between what actually happened and what *would* have happened was very small. So small, in fact, that releasing prisoners seems a perfectly safe approach.

At present one can hardly turn to the media without being bombarded by breathless accounts of “[smash and grab](#)” thefts plaguing higher-end retailers, and particularly in California. In one of the most brazen heists, ninety suspects in twenty-five cars “stormed” a Northern California store last month, making off with “more than \$100,000” worth of goods “in about a minute.”

But the problem isn’t new. [According to a notable “Red” media source](#), “brazen acts of petty theft and shoplifting” supposedly enabled and encouraged by Prop. 47 were being reported across California two years ago. [Proposition 20](#), an initiative submitted to the state’s voters last year, promised to remedy things by lowering the bar for charging felony theft and doing away with early paroles, in effect reversing the easings brought on by Propositions 47 and 57.

Full stop. In the immediate post-Floyd era, justice and equity [remain of grave concern](#). So much so, that even after retiring, former Governor Jerry Brown leaped back into the fray and called Proposition 20 a “[prison spending scam](#).” And scam or not, [it got trounced](#). But time has passed, and as [a breathless article](#) in the *Washington Post* just reported (it features video from hard-hit San Francisco), the chaos persists:

Retail executives and security experts say the rise of such robberies — which have gone viral online and in some cases, spurred copycats — is the culmination of several factors, including a shortage of security guards, reluctance by police and prosecutors to pursue shoplifting offenses, and the growing use of social media as an organizational tool.

Evildoers are seemingly capitalizing on the less punitive atmosphere for their own selfish gain. What might happen should a “new and improved” Proposition 20 be introduced is anyone’s guess.

Posted 11/20/24

CITIZEN MISBEHAVIOR BREEDS VOTER DISCONTENT

Progressive agendas face rebuke in even the “Bluest” of places



For Police Issues by Julius (Jay) Wachtel. This image from Google maps depicts a modest home in a working-class area of Los Angeles. We’ll have more to say about it later. But let’s begin with a major California city that’s even “Bluer” than L.A. We mean, of course, San Francisco. That’s where ardently progressive Mayor London Breed just lost her bid to continue serving the City by the Bay. While the victor, Daniel Lurie (a heir to the Levi Strauss fortune) is also “Blue”, he prides himself as being a moderate sort. In fact, his avowed goals of “restoring safety, ending homelessness and shutting down open-air drug markets” actually [led the “Reds” to anoint him](#) as their number-one pick.



Across the Bay the story was much the same. Voters in “Blue” Oakland [recalled Mayor Sheng Thao and Alameda County Dist. Atty. Pamela Price](#), two strong liberal voices who had only been in office since 2022. According to a spokesperson for the Mayoral recall, Oakland’s progressives “did the same thing they did in San Francisco. They ignored the crime. They ignored the poverty.”

Ditto, L.A. That’s where voters just handed D.A. George Gascon [an overwhelming thumbs-down](#). A nationally-known progressive, his liberal policies, which forbid charging juveniles as adults, barred the prosecution of a wide range of misdemeanors, and disallowed the use of sentence enhancements, made more than a few assistant D.A.’s livid. In his place the electorate installed Nathan Hochman. A former Federal prosecutor and (surprise!) defense lawyer, his campaign pledge to cast aside Gascon’s permissive agenda drew fervent support from police and, as one might



expect, from the D.A.'s disgruntled subordinates. And ultimately from the public, who handed the self-avowed crime fighter a twenty-percentage point margin.

And that's not all. [By an even greater margin of 40 percent](#) California voters hollowed out a decade-old progressive measure, [Proposition 47](#), that had watered down punishments for theft and drug crimes. Spanking-new [Proposition 36](#) addressed the alleged consequences – a plague of smash-and-grabs that continues to beset retailers – by increasing penalties for group thefts and designating all thefts committed by repeaters as felonies. To combat the fentanyl and hard-drugs scourge that plagues the Golden State, punishments for drug dealing were also substantially stiffened.

Still, even if true, Mr. Hochman's reassurance that [cops' hands won't be "tied" during his shift](#) at best offers an incomplete solution. According to newly-appointed LAPD Chief Jim McDonnell, the failure to prosecute "low-level" offending (read: bad-old George Gascon) made victims less likely to call police. Their reluctance to report crimes, he fears, has become so deeply entrenched that it's actually exaggerated the magnitude of the so-called "crime drop."

Chief McDonnell wants citizens to call the cops even for relatively minor crimes. Problem is, the reluctance to prosecute may have made cops reluctant to act. In any event, what ultimately happens has never been controlled by the first two wheels of



the criminal justice system. Courts with judges and a correctional system with probation and parole agents occupy the *really* definitive end. Even if cops and

assistant D.A.'s do their very best, the consequences of criminal misconduct are for others to decide. As we've frequently pointed out, those "consequences" often seem insufficient, sometimes wildly so. Check out our November 8, 2024 update to "[A Broken System](#)":

Darion C. McMillian, 23, [was recently released from parole](#) after being imprisoned for a 2019 shooting. And on November 4 he was on electronic monitoring for a pending drug case when Chicago police officers approached the double-parked car that he occupied. McMillian opened fire with a pistol converted by a "switch" to full-auto, killing Officer Enrique Martinez and, apparently by accident, the driver of his own vehicle. McMillian fled but was soon arrested. Officer Martinez, himself a young person, had less than three years on the job.



Soon after completing his parole term for the 2019 shooting, a crime for which he served four years in prison, McMillian picked up two arrests for felony drug offenses. Both times he was released with an ankle monitor to await further proceedings. He would



soon use a homemade machinegun to murder [Chicago police officer Enrique Martinez](#). A felon's compassionate treatment was arguably responsible for a young officer's violent death. [And there's been political consequences](#). Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson, a progressive figure who's considered no friend of the police, caught a lot of flack. Here's what Hizzoner announced a few days before the fallen officer's funeral:

I heard from the family and am honoring their request and will no longer plan to attend the honors funeral services.

Back to L.A. And to our image of that house. On November 7, 2024 [its 93-year old resident told LAPD officers](#) that she was hearing “knocking sounds” from underneath. Officers discovered that a 27-year old man had taken up residence in the crawl space. After “an hours-long standoff,” the naked trespasser

Arrest date	Charge	Disposition
5/15/24	Violate post-release supv.	10/16/24: 142 days jail, half served, balance waived
2/15/24	Violate post-release supv.	4/8/24: 120 days jail
10/5/23	Trespass, occupy property w/o owner's consent (misd.)	4/12/24: Dismissed int. of justice
9/1/23	Violate post-release supv.	10/12/23: Supv. revoked/Reinstated
7/5/23	Violate post-release supv.	8/18/23: Supv. revoked/Reinstated
10/18/19	Elder/dep. adult abuse, assault w/deadly wpn, threats, obstruct.	10/16/22: Pled nolo to felony abuse, other chgs. dismiss. Three years prison.
7/31/19	Lying in doorway	10/23/19 Dismissed int. of justice
10/10/16	Loitering, peeking, public intox.	1/23/17 18 mos. diversion
1/22/16	Vandalism, obstruct bus., trespass	6/22/16 Dismissed int. of justice

emerged. His [L.A. Superior Court](#) record is summarized above. As one might expect, his most recent tangle wasn't his first. Also note that his record includes a felony conviction for crimes including “elder abuse,” which led to a prison term. His most recent offending – that crawl space thingy – is “only” a misdemeanor. So he was released, with a court date in December.

Care to wager on his behavior until then?

As we've repeatedly pointed out (see, for example, "[Catch and Release](#),") even chronic evildoers get breaks. Here, for instance, is our November 4, 2024 update to "[A Broken System](#)":

Nineteen-year old Nhazel Warren had recent arrests for gun possession and fleeing [when officers caught him illegally packing a pistol in July](#). He was released with an ankle monitor. Warren then committed a home invasion. He was arrested and released on bond and, again, with an ankle monitor. He went on to commit several more armed robberies; his most recent arrest was a week ago. Again, he was released on bond. And again, with a monitor. All along, Warren was supposedly being monitored by the Probation Dept. But there's no record that they ever put his "tracking" devices to work.

Warren's most recent release, which followed his reportedly *fifth* armed robbery arrest, was on \$150,000 bail. Again, care to wager on how he'll behave?

Misbehavior by releasees is commonplace. There's a reason why one of our related posts (see below) was entitled "[Cause and Effect](#)." Whether cops and prosecutors will vigorously address "lower level" offenses – and whether repeaters will be strictly dealt with by judges and agencies of supervision – is yet to be seen. Hopefully the measures promised by L.A.'s new D.A. and police chief will take hold, and there will be no need for us to wag "naughty, naughty" again.

Check back!

Posted 4/27/24

DE-PROSECUTION? WHAT'S THAT?

Philadelphia's D.A. eased up on lawbreakers. Did it increase crime?




For Police Issues by Julius (Jay) Wachtel. The slugfest between academics kicked off in July 2022. That's when [Criminology & Public Policy](#) published Thomas P. Hogan's "[De-prosecution and death: A synthetic control analysis of the impact of de-prosecution on homicides](#)". Mr. Hogan, a lawyer, has served as a Federal prosecutor and D.A. He holds a Master's in criminology and is a skilled statistician. His deeply-researched article, which focused on Philadelphia's purposeful throttling back of felony and misdemeanor prosecutions between 2015-2019, compared its criminal homicide numbers and case characteristics with those of the other largest 100 U.S. cities, applying elaborate controls on everything from demographics to prosecutorial policies and resources. He concluded that Philadelphia D.A. Larry Krasner's policy of de-prosecution, which he instituted in February 2018, only a month after taking office, had caused a "historically large increase in homicides" of about 74 more per year.

And yes, there was blowback. In an elaborate critique, "[De-prosecution and death: A comment on the fatal flaws in Hogan \(2022\)](#)", researchers Jacob Kaplan, J.J. Naddeo and Tom Scott argued that methodological and data issues essentially nullified Mr. Hogan's findings. In a prompt and mind-numbingly elaborate rejoinder, "[De-Prosecution and A Cordial Reply to Kaplan, Naddeo and Scott](#)," Mr. Hogan countered that it was the critique that was fatally flawed. Among its other failings, it supposedly relied on severe undercounts of Philadelphia homicides. He insisted that once these (and many other) errors were corrected, the contrarians actually lent his conclusions even more weight. He also insisted that his findings were not surprising. After all, they're consistent with the classic model of deterrence, which is based on "swiftness and certainty of apprehensions, then leading to sanctions"


Concerns about the effects of de-prosecution have drawn the attention of other academics. A new essay in *Criminology & Public Policy*, “[Do progressive prosecutors increase crime? A quasi experimental analysis of crime rates in the 100 largest counties, 2000–2020](#)”, concludes that progressive prosecutorial policies led to a statistically significant seven-percent jump in property (but not violent) crime rates.

Slugfest over “cause” aside, what’s not at issue is that the alleged “effect” – an increase in violence – *did* take place, and that Philadelphia’s steep rise [has been more-or-less in sync with its progressive D.A.’s tenure](#). Elected in a community where “Blues” outnumber the “Reds” seven to one, Mr. Krasner took office in January 2018 vowing to tone down the harsh, punitive policies of his predecessors. He was re-elected in 2021, and his current, second term will end in 2026.



We used [Philadelphia PD data](#) to build this graph. After a steep retreat in 2013, when murders reached a low of 246, criminal homicides began to increase. In 2017 there were 315, and by the end of 2018 – Mr. Krasner’s first full year in office – they reached 353. After remaining at that level through 2019, murders really took off. In pandemic-addled 2020 they numbered 499, a single-year increase of 41 percent. And they kept going up, reaching a decade-and-a-half high of 562 in 2021. Things then toned down, and by 2023 killings were “only” sixteen percent higher than in 2019.

Full stop. The pandemic supposedly increased violence *everywhere*. Switching to murder rates per 100,000 population, let’s bring in two demographically similar, violence-prone places, D.C. and Chicago. Check out this graph (click [here](#) for Philadelphia stat’s, [here](#) for Chicago, and [here](#) for D.C.)



As one would expect, each city experienced a substantial uptick during 2019-2020. Chicago's rates increased the most, by 10.4 points. Philadelphia came in second at 8.8 points, and D.C. was third with 4.3 points. Murders in Chicago and Philadelphia have since eased back. But as we recently mentioned in "[America's Violence-Beset Capital City](#)", D.C.'s criminal homicide count shot through the roof.

Note that killings in Chicago and Philadelphia track quite closely. Might that bring the "cause" behind Philly's increase (de-prosecution) into question? Actually, Chicago's experience lends support to Mr. Hogan's thesis. You see, Kim Foxx, its elected D.A., has also come under severe fire for her progressivism. While the political blow-back has been most harsh from "Red" ideological sorts, [former members of her own staff have roundly blamed her](#) for the Windy City's violence problem.


Philly, meet Chicago!

The reasons for Philadelphia's sharp, post-2018 spike in violent crime was ultimately addressed by State legislators. [Pennsylvania House Resolution 216](#), adopted during the 2021-2022 session, established a committee to "investigate, review and make findings and recommendations concerning rising rates of crime, law enforcement and the enforcement of crime victim rights." Issued in October 2022, its "[Second Interim Report](#)" blamed D.A. Krasner's progressive policies. Among many other things, he had prohibited assistant D.A.'s from charging crimes relating to marijuana or prostitution, strongly discouraged them from prosecuting lesser retail thefts, and severely limited requests to impose cash bail. More than a few prosecutors had objected. Thirty-one were promptly fired:

One of the 31 ADAs let go by DA Krasner in his first week in office told the Select Committee that DA Krasner’s mismanagement led to an office that is essentially full of defense attorneys who just want to get defendants out of jail.

It’s not just Philadelphia and Chicago. Many current and former deputies have criticized Los Angeles County D.A. George Gascon for a “soft on crime” approach that, among other things, limits the use of sentence enhancements and prohibits transferring juveniles to adult court. Several sued alleging that he retaliated against them for opposing his policies; [one was just awarded \\$1.5 million](#). Although a recall campaign failed, Gascon faces eleven challengers in the forthcoming primary. His prospects are decidedly uncertain.

Posts in *Police Issues*’ “[Neighborhoods](#)” special topic frequently comment on the strong link between violence and poverty. Police precincts in economically downtrodden areas throughout the U.S. report substantially higher rates of murder, aggravated assault and robbery. For example, check out recent probes of D.C. (“[America’s Violence-Beset Capital City](#)”) and New York City and Los Angeles (“[See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil](#)”). Philadelphia is no exception. These graphs use Philadelphia’s [official crime data](#) to illustrate the relationship between poverty and criminal homicide during the first three months of 2013, 2018, 2023 and 2024 (each murder is a “dot”). Addresses were coded for their Zip’s, and Zip poverty figures were drawn from the [Census](#).



We computed the r (correlation) statistic between poverty and murder for each of the four three-month datasets. It ranges from zero, meaning no relationship between variables, to plus or minus 1, meaning a perfect association. In 2013 the relationship, $r = .50$, was of moderate strength. Generally, as poverty increased, so did homicide. By 2018 their link had become stronger, producing an r of .69. And the correlations in 2023 and 2024 (.73 and .74) were even more substantial. Bottom line: residents of Philadelphia's poorer areas were disproportionately affected by murder from the start. And things only got worse.

According to [Zipcodes.com](https://www.zipcodes.com), Philadelphia has 46 residential Zip's. We broke them down into low- and high-poverty groups (less than or more than 20 percent poverty), then used population figures to compute homicide rates per 100,000 population:

	Zips	Poverty	Avg Pov	TT Pop	Avg pop				
Pov <20%	25	5.4-19.5%	12.6	680,659	27,226				
Pov >20%	21	20.3-40.8%	30.1	873,779	41,609				
Totals	46	5.4-40.8%	20.6	1,554,438	33,792				
	Cr. homicides Jan-Mar				Cr homicide rt. Jan-Mar				
	2013	2018	2023	2024	2013	2018	2023	2024	
Pov <20%	13	12	10	8	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.2	
Pov >20%	42	60	92	61	4.8	6.9	10.5	7.0	
Totals	55	72	102	69	3.5	4.6	6.6	4.4	

One caveat is that a few Zip's extend beyond the city limits, so some murder counts may be slightly understated. That aside, there is a profound difference in murder rates between better-off Zip's and their economically-struggling counterparts. In 2013 the average murder rate for all 46 Zip's was 3.5. But the average rate for the poorer (4.8) was two-and-one-half times that of the wealthier (1.9). And it got worse. In 2023 the disparity (1.5/10.5) was seven-fold, and in 2024 it was nearly six-fold (1.2/7.0). That's why the r 's got so pronounced.

Once again: residents of poorer areas got the short end of the stick from the very start. And things got worse over time. Much worse. No, we're not blaming it all on de-prosecution. According to [NIJ](https://www.nij.gov), "the likelihood of being caught and punished" are crucial to deterrence. That automatically brings cops into the picture:

The police deter crime when they do things that strengthen a criminal's perception of the certainty of being caught. Strategies that use the police as "sentinels," such as hot spots policing, are particularly effective.

An article just published in *Criminology & Public Policy*, "[Can increasing preventive patrol in large geographic areas reduce crime?](#)", concludes that "increased police

presence and increased police patrols” (say, a so-called “hot spots” approach) led to statistically significant reductions in both property and violent crime. And when cops (perhaps driven by the likelihood that D.A.’s won’t prosecute) step back, the consequences can be dramatic. “[When police pull back: Neighborhood-level effects of de-policing on violent and property crime](#)” examined the effects in Denver. A post-Floyd decrease in traffic and pedestrian stops (there were 32,000 fewer in 2020) was significantly associated with an increase in violent crime. And the corresponding drop in drug arrests was tied to an increase in property crime.

Bottom line: “de-policing” is probably more likely than “de-prosecution” to encourage misbehavior. [After declaring “a public safety emergency” in January](#), Philadelphia’s new Mayor, Cherelle Parker asked that officers return to using “stop and frisk,” a practice they had apparently discontinued after complaints it was being abused. The desire for a more active police presence is also percolating through violence-beset D.C. On March 11, Mayor Muriel Bowser signed “[Secure D.C.](#)” One of the massive bill’s provisions directs police to designate “drug-free zones” in areas troubled by crime and disorder. Another stipulates that violent crimes, whether committed by adults or juveniles, carry a “rebuttable presumption in favor of pretrial detention”. And a brand-new law invokes heavy penalties for directing organized retail theft.

A desire for more policing has even made itself felt in...San Francisco! Faced with a steep rise in drug use and homelessness, the most progressive major burg in progressive California recently loosened its reins on the cops. By a 60-40 majority, [voters set aside a bucketful of rules](#) that severely restricted what officers do and how they go about doing it. For example, instead of limiting pursuits to the most aggravated circumstances, [cops can now chase](#) if they have a “reasonable suspicion that a person committed, is committing or is likely to commit a felony or violent misdemeanor” (emphasis added).

Your writer is for immediately de-commissioning de-prosecution (so long, Mr. Krasner!). It’s a lousy concept, and has probably led cops to pull back as well. After all, if a D.A. won’t follow through, why bother? As a former law enforcement practitioner he also supports focused policing; i.e., the “hot-spots” approach. Still, as our posts often point out, cops *are* human. And when some badge-wearers encounter uncompliant citizens, they seem unable to set aside their inner monsters. So before returning to a more aggressive posture, we’d prefer a pause. Let’s make a concerted effort to refine mechanisms, including selection, training and supervision, that can help officers take on – and maintain – the perspective of a skilled craftsman at *every* encounter. Then, and *only* then, crank it back up.

Deal?

Posted 4/4/22

JUDICIAL DETACHMENT: MYTH OR REALITY?

A Supreme Court candidate gets slammed for liberal bias



	<u>Begin</u>		<u>2020</u>
	3.2	Thomas	3.0
	2.0	Alito	2.2
	1.1	Gorsuch	1.1
	1.0	Barrett	1.0
	0.6	Kavanaugh	0.5
	1.4	Roberts	0.5
	-1.4	Kagan	-1.5
	-1.4	Breyer	-1.9
	-1.7	Sotomayor	-4.0

For Police Issues by Julius (Jay) Wachtel. In his prior life as a Fed your writer frequently authored detailed affidavits while seeking arrest and search warrants for gun crimes. But the sworn declaration he just downloaded from the D.C. Federal court's [PACER website](#) is by far the most nauseating such document that he's ever read ([case no. 1:13-cr-00244-KBJ](#)).

In 2013 the Washington D.C. FBI Child Exploitation Task Force was tipped that someone had been uploading videos to the Internet showing naked "prepubescent boys" engaging in oral and anal sex. An undercover D.C. police detective subsequently exchanged emails with the suspect, Wesley Hawkins, 18. Hawkins wrote that "he likes children ages 11 to 17, and that he has videos to share." And he did, sending on two "of a prepubescent male masturbating."

Other tips led to the discovery of two-dozen-plus videos and still images uploaded by Hawkins that depicted male and female children and prepubescent boys flaunting their intimate parts and engaging in oral and anal sex. In June 2013 officers served a search warrant at his residence. They turned up a laptop replete with child pornography. It reportedly included:

"24:06 minute video depicting an approximately 12 year-old male masturbating before a web camera; 1:57 minute video depicting an approximately 8 year-old male masturbating before a web camera; 11:47 minute video depicting an approximately 11 year-old male masturbating and being anally penetrated by an adult male; 15:19 minute video depicting two approximately 11 year-old males

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masturbating and performing sexual acts on each other; 7:51 minute video depicting an approximately 12 year-old male masturbating....”

Note that at least one video featured an “adult male” participant (no, it wasn’t Hawkins). Hawkins initially denied everything. But he soon conceded that his laptop held some deeply incriminating goods.

He wasn’t accused of actually taking the videos. Still, by posting and sharing them he had participated in a process that can profoundly damage children. Hawkins soon pled guilty to one count of possessing child pornography [[18 USC 2252A\(a\)\(5\)\(B\)](#)]. Since some of the affected minors were less than twelve years of age, he could have hypothetically drawn as many as twenty years. Sentencing-wise, several potential enhancements *did* apply:

...the material involved prepubescent minors or minors under the age of 12 (+2); the offense involved distribution (+2); the material portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct (+4); the offense involved the use of a computer (+2); the offense involved 600 or more images (+5)...

Given Hawkins’ lack of a prior criminal record, [Sentencing Commission guidelines](#) called for a [range of 97 to 121 months imprisonment](#). His youth and cooperation, though, led prosecutors to recommend a more lenient disposition: twenty-four months custody followed by 96 months of supervised release.

So what did Hawkins actually *get*? Well, some of our readers likely know. But don’t fret: we’ll return to Mr. Hawkins in a moment.

On January 27, 2022 [U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer revealed](#) that after twenty-seven years on the nation’s high court, he was ready to retire. Less than a month later [President Joe Biden announced](#) that in line with his pledge to appoint a Black woman as the next Justice, he had selected D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson to fill the vacancy. His official statement led off with the two core principles that everyone hopes underlie judicial decisionmaking:

Because of her diverse and broad public service, Judge Jackson has a unique appreciation of how critical it is for the justice system to be *fair and impartial* [emphasis ours]. With multiple law enforcement officials in her family, she also has a personal understanding of the stakes of the legal system. After serving in the U.S. Army and being deployed to Iraq and Egypt, Jackson’s brother

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
served as a police officer in Baltimore and two of her uncles were police officers in Miami.

As one would expect, Justice Jackson's qualifications are indeed awesome. Even so, President Biden knows that given the constituencies that some Senators must please, her confirmation could present a struggle even within the "Blues." And with the Senate evenly split, literally every vote "counts." That, in turn, may explain why the President's comments emphasized that Justice Jackson has family ties to, well, *the cops*.


Nominated by President Bill Clinton, Justice Breyer was considered a "Blue" sort. Ditto his anointed successor. Her selection reflects the Red/Blue, right/left, conservative/liberal ideological divide that Professor Richard Hasen claims ("[Polarization and the Judiciary](#)") has long guided the selection of State and Federal judges and justices, deeply affecting outcomes in fraught areas such as guns, abortion and affirmative action. As for the Supreme Court, professors Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum ("[Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court](#)") conclude that its decisions have closely tracked Party lines for over a decade:

Since 2010, when Elena Kagan replaced John Paul Stevens, all of the Republican-nominated Justices on the Supreme Court have been to the right of all of its Democratic-nominated Justices. This pattern is widely recognized, but it is not well recognized that it is unique in the Court's history. Before 2010, the Court never had clear ideological blocs that coincided with party lines.

Professors Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn devised [a widely accepted approach](#) that uses Supreme Court decisions to scale Justices' ideological preference, from the most liberal (-5.0) to the most conservative (+5.0). An M-Q score gets assigned to each Justice at the end of every term. Check out our lead graphic. Excepting Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh And Barrett, who began in 2016, 2018 and 2020 respectively, the left-side score represents the year 2010. Here's a companion visual that tracks M-Q's thru 2020:



With a couple of exceptions (note Roberts' moderation and Sotomayor's plunge from moderately liberal to off-the-charts) M-Q scores remain remarkably consistent, term-in and term-out. But put decisions aside. In "[Split Definitive](#)" Professors Devins and Baum highlight the salience of ideology by analyzing Justices' preferences when it comes to hiring clerks. This graphic depicts the proportion of clerks during the 2005-2016 terms who had served lower-court judges appointed by Republicans.



It's clear that the conservative Justices (the five on the right) were determined to hire clerks with "Red" backgrounds, while their liberal colleagues preferred those of the "Blue" persuasion.

That Justices are ideologically split is old news. (For a list of relevant articles and news pieces click [here](#).) Indeed, it's assumed that each will come down on a certain side in every ideologically-charged decision. Here, for an example, is an extract from [a recent story in the Los Angeles Times](#) about a case before the Court. Apparently, the California business community (read: conservative-leaning) is challenging a State law, which has been backed by State court decisions, that lets workers sue employers even though they supposedly agreed when hired that all disputes would be arbitrated:

The court's conservative justices said little during Wednesday's argument in *Viking River Cruises vs. Moriana*, while the three liberals spoke in defense of the California law. "This is the state's decision to enforce its own labor laws in a particular kind of way," Justice Elena Kagan said.

California is reportedly the only State that does that. Its high court refused to hear an appeal, but the U.S. Supreme Court has taken on the case. Given its present conservative

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majority (and Justice Kavanaugh’s mention that “California is an outlier here”) a business-friendly ruling seems likely.

But what does judicial ideology have to do with our (hopefully, one-time) fan of child pornography? A lot. You see, Wesley Hawkins’ [three-month sentence](#), whose length was *one-eighth* of what the prosecutor recommended, was handed down by D.C. Court of Appeals Justice – now, Supreme Court nominee – [Ketanji Brown Jackson](#) while she served as a D.C. District Court judge. Justice Jackson, who began her Government career as a Federal Public Defender, [has been severely criticized by Republicans](#) for demonstrating “empathy” (i.e., leniency) when sentencing Hawkins and other child pornographers.

27	Filed:	11/22/2013	Judgment
	Entered:	11/25/2013	
28	Filed:	11/22/2013	Statement of Reasons
	Entered:	11/25/2013	

 Query

This document is not available.

We downloaded several documents from Mr. Hawkins’ criminal case. This graphic depicts two of the final entries on the index page: the judgment (click [here](#) for the document) and an accompanying “Statement of Reasons.” Ostensibly, the latter would have explained Judge Jackson’s pronounced “downward departure” from the two-year term recommended by prosecutors, which was itself substantially less than what Sentencing Commission guidelines prescribe. Alas, clicking on the link returned “not available.”


So we turned to [FactCheck.org](#). Their extensive coverage of the case includes Justice Jackson’s explanation of her sentencing decision during questioning by her most ardent antagonist, Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo). Here’s a brief extract:

I remember in that case that defense counsel was arguing for probation, in part because he argued that here we had a very young man just graduated from high school. He presented all of his diplomas and certificates and the things that he had done and argued consistent with what I was seeing in the record that this particular defendant had gotten into this in a way that was, I thought, inconsistent with some of the other cases that I had seen.

FactCheck looked into seven child-pornography sentences that supposedly reflect Justice Jackson’s excessively forgiving nature. Our graph orders them according to the

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recommended sentence under the guidelines (black bar), from the least severe (left) to the most (right). Mr. Hawkins' case is the fourth.



In each, the actual sentence given by then-judge Jackson was less than what prosecutors had sought, and in four cases (#3, #4, #5 and #6) substantially so.

Justice Jackson has said [that her sentences were not overly lenient](#). “Nothing could be further from the truth,” she insists. Yet her obvious empathy for the accused [has become a “flashpoint.”](#) It’s not that she ignores victims. [While sentencing Mr. Hawkins she agonized](#) about “children who are being trapped and molested and raped for the viewing pleasure of people like yourself.” The case file included [a statement from one of the youths depicted in the images](#) which “describes how being a victim of child pornography has affected many areas of the victim’s life, including the victim’s inability to trust adults and struggle with anger issues.” Yet then-Judge Jackson held back. “You were only involved in this for a few months...Other than your engagement with the undercover officer, there isn’t an indication that you were in any online communities to advance your collecting behavior.”

Did Mr. Hawkins’ sentence convey a sufficiently stern warning? Perhaps not. According to [a Washington Post investigation](#) (it’s otherwise very favorable to the Justice) a probation document filed as Mr. Hawkins’ term of supervision neared its end reported that “despite being in treatment for more than five years [Mr. Hawkins] continues to seek out sexually arousing, non-pornographic material and images of males 13 to 16-years-old.” He had to serve his last six months of release in a halfway house.

Over the years we’ve repeatedly mentioned the “tendency to seek out information and interpret events in a way that affirms one’s predilections and beliefs.” That nasty interloper – its official title is “[confirmation bias](#)” – can affect most anyone, from out-

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and-out ideologues to supposedly objective, data-driven scientists. And, as our graphs seem to demonstrate, Supreme Court justices. But [Justice Jackson denied](#) that she purposely aligned with either the “Reds” or the “Blues”:

I decide cases from a neutral posture. I evaluate the facts, and I interpret and apply the law to the facts of the case before me, without fear or favor, consistent with my judicial oath.

Might she prove an exception to the rule?

Ask us in a couple years, once her M-Q scores are in.

Posted 11/10/15

MORE CRIMINALS (ON THE STREET), LESS CRIME?

Debating the virtues of a less punitive agenda

By Julius (Jay) Wachtel. During the early 1970s New York’s “Rockefeller laws” sought to quell rampant drug dealing and drug-related violence by imposing mandatory prison sentences on persons caught selling or possessing modest quantities of heroin, cocaine and other illegal drugs. In 2009 the state changed course. Many so-called “low-level” drug offenders – meaning possessors and dealers whose involvement was modest and who lacked a prior conviction for a violent crime – could escape incarceration by completing a course of treatment. Six years later the [Vera Institute announced](#) the outcome of a study that compared matched samples of offenders processed under both schemes. The results seemed encouraging. Fifty-four percent of those sentenced under the old, punitive Rockefeller laws were rearrested within two years of release or discharge, six percent for a violent offense. For those diverted to treatment under the new laws, the outcomes were thirty-six percent and three percent, respectively.

New York isn’t alone. Last year [we blogged](#) about California’s Proposition 47, which reduced penalties from felonies to misdemeanors for grand theft, shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, and check forgery when losses were under \$950. Possessing drugs also became a misdemeanor. A similar approach was adopted by the Feds. In 2014 the [U.S. Sentencing Commission](#) relaxed Federal drug sentencing guidelines, [enabling as many as 6,000 inmates](#) to seek immediate release, and up to 40,000 more in the not-so-distant future.

Financial pressures and prison crowding prompted states and the Federal government to ease up on punishment. Approaches include releasing prisoners, amending penal codes to reduce sentence length and downgrade some felonies to misdemeanors, and instituting or expanding the use of diversion and treatment.

That doesn’t mean that offending is being completely forgiven. Misdemeanors are still crimes. But shifting away from imprisonment increased the burden on parole and probation offices and local lockups. These, in turn, [accommodated the influx](#) by freeing jail inmates and limiting the length and intensity of post-release supervision. Unlike penal revisions, though, tweaks pulled off at lower levels aren’t necessarily enshrined in codebooks. There is no obvious cost, until there is. In a notorious 2013 example,

California authorities repeatedly reinstated a habitual parole violator until the man, a convicted sex offender, murdered a 76-year old woman and chopped up her body.

While the outcomes of going easy aren't always so stark, the consequences of the new normal may in time prove profound. "Now, you can get away with it" bragged a chronic offender, who [admitted he began stealing bicycles](#) when California raised the felony theft threshold to \$750. Even better, he could still use drugs because nothing happens when he fails to show up for drug rehab. L.A. County Sheriff Jim McDonnell said that's to be expected. "We've removed the disincentive, but we haven't created a meaningful incentive."

To help make their approach more palatable, advocates of leniency point to the crime drop that we've enjoyed since the madness of the eighties and early nineties. If crime is falling, why not experiment? However, as we mentioned in prior posts ([click here](#) and [here](#)), one likely reason for the "great crime drop" was that increased punishment deterred those who could be deterred while incapacitating the rest.

There are now disquieting signs that violence is again on the rise. As of August 2015, the murder rate in New York City was [nine percent higher](#) than at the same point in 2014. Dallas, Kansas City, Chicago and New Orleans have reported moderate upticks ranging from 17 to 22 percent, and substantial increases were recorded in Washington, D.C. (44 percent), Baltimore (56 percent), St. Louis (60 percent), and Milwaukee (76 percent). Property crime has also gone up in many areas; most recently, with "[double-digit](#)" [increases](#) in Los Angeles.

Some argue that the threat is overblown, as only drug possessors and other nonviolent offenders are in line for a break. First, as we pointed out in "[Rewarding the Naughty](#)," that's not necessarily true. As long as a California inmate's most recent offense didn't involve the use of significant force, those with past convictions short of murder are just as eligible for relief under the new laws as anyone else. What's more, the oft-repeated screed that a majority of inmates are there for drug possession doesn't hold up. According to the [Bureau of Justice Statistics](#), only 3.6 percent of state prisoners in 2013 were locked up for drug possession. Fifty-three percent were serving time for a violent crime and 10.5 percent for burglary. In 2014, 96.6 percent of [Federal drug convictions](#) were for drug trafficking, and only 0.9 percent for simple possession.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, citizens are far more concerned about the quantity of crime than the characteristics of its perpetrators. To claim that some offenders are somewhat less likely to be recidivists is little comfort when crime is on the rise. Still, this is not a call to "lock 'em up and throw away the key". Excessive

punishment drains resources while consigning human beings – for that’s what convicted criminals are – to needlessly prolonged misery. Your writer would be delighted to arbitrarily halve or even quarter prison terms if adequate resources were provided to help former convicts successfully integrate into conventional society. Naturally, there would have to be vast improvements in the delivery of education, counseling, housing and job training services. To help former inmates become self-sufficient, it would probably be necessary to provide financial incentives to potential employers. But as we know from the [failed deinstitutionalization movement](#), which promised great savings and more humane outcomes by shifting the mentally ill from state sanatoria to community treatment, successful remedies are expensive. Instead of making the necessary investments, we transformed street cops into orderlies and city jails into mental wards.

Unless we dig deep into our pockets, these are precisely the results that we will get by deinstitutionalizing criminal offenders. Count on it!

Posted 2/9/20

MUST THE DOOR REVOLVE?

Bail and sentencing reform come. Then stuff happens.



For Police Issues by Julius (Jay) Wachtel. Must the door that feeds jails and prisons forever revolve? Can we unplug the thing without causing even more pain? Let's start with three recent horror stories:

- Last November, Charles Goforth, a 56-year old Chicago-area man, [shot and wounded his girlfriend](#). He was soon arrested in Missouri. But a magistrate released him on an \$8,000 cash bond and Goforth went home to his wife. On January 30 he revisited his victim, who was recuperating at home, and shot her dead.
- “I can’t believe they let me out” said Gerof Woodberry, 42. [New York City cops arrested him](#) on January 10 for “stealing or attempting to steal” from four (count ‘em, four!) banks. Thanks to a [new state law](#) that abolishes bail for non-violent crimes, he was released two days later. Woodberry, who had served prison sentences in South Carolina for five strong-arm robberies, promptly robbed two banks in four days. He’s now in Federal custody, where the rules are different.

- On October 13 two small children found their mother's lifeless body on the bedroom floor of their New York City apartment. [She had been beaten to death](#). It took two months for police to arrest her alleged murderer, Asun Thomas, 46. He had been living in a halfway house since being paroled in 2016 after doing sixteen years of a 20-year term for manslaughter.

We realize that Goforth, Woodberry and Thomas can't be used to represent the universe of persons who are released pending trial or after serving a term of incarceration. They're an "accidental" sample compiled from stories that caught your blogger's eye while perusing *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Chicago Tribune*, something he does most mornings. (And yes, he's got subscriptions. You should, too!)

Recidivism is a weighty subject. [DOJ's Bureau of Justice Statistics](#) has been studying it for some time. In 2018 it published data about recidivism for a sample of 401,288 convicted felons who were released in 2005 after serving prison terms in thirty States. During their first nine years of freedom the former inmates compiled an average of five arrests each. Nearly half (44 percent) were arrested during the first year, and sixty-eight percent during the first three years. By the end of the ninth year a full eighty-three percent had been arrested at least once. As for *type* of crime, Table 7 of the [report](#) indicates that regardless of the crime for which they were originally confined – violent, property, public order or drug-related – about four in ten were arrested at least once, post-release, for a crime of violence.

[Research on Federal prisoners](#) also paints a gloomy picture. [A study](#) of 25,431 Federal convicts released in 2005 indicates that within eight years half (49.3 percent) were arrested on new charges. Nearly one-third of the sample (31.7 percent) suffered another conviction, and nearly one-quarter (24.6 percent) were re-incarcerated. Since these were former Federal inmates, a majority of the original convictions were for drug trafficking. But about one-quarter (23.3 percent) of the post-release arrests were for assault.

Are there ways to help former inmates avoid reoffending? NIJ's "[Corrections & Reentry](#)" webpage features reviews of 136 "programs" (approaches tailored to specific places) and thirty "practices" (methods used at multiple sites.) Each was rated as either "no effect," "promising" or "effective."

A "program" in Massachusetts' capital city, the "[Boston Reentry Initiative](#)," actually begins while offenders are still locked up. Meant for gang members and others at high risk of committing a violent crime, the voluntary effort – inmates must ask to join –

offers everything from assistance in getting a driver's license to help with substance abuse, housing and job training. After release there's a day center; each former offender also gets a "case manager" who provides one-on-one help for up to eighteen months. BRI's "promising" rating is based on an [academic study](#) that concluded participants were significantly less likely than non-participants to be arrested post-release. During their first three years back on the street, arrests for any crime befell 77.8 percent of the BRI cohort and 87.7 percent of a non-BRI control group. Arrests for violent crimes followed the same pattern (27.8 and 39.2 percent, respectively.)

Several efforts in NIJ's "practices" category also seemed pertinent:

- "[Pretrial Interventions for Ensuring Appearance in Court](#)" evaluated three approaches for combatting failure-to-appear and re-arrest: court notifications (reminders), cash and appearance bonds, and pretrial supervision, ranging from electronic monitoring to placement in a halfway house. Of these, only pretrial supervision demonstrated a statistically significant reduction on failures to appear (this effect, which led to a "promising" rating, was nonetheless considered "small.") None of the methods, however, reduced rearrests.
- "[Day Reporting Centers](#)" (aka "community resource centers" or "attendance centers") offer non-residential services to parolees and probationers, including supervision, drug abuse treatment and job training and placement. A 2019 meta-evaluation of nine such efforts found that none was more effective in preventing recidivism than conventional probation and parole.
- "[Noncustodial Employment Programs for Ex-Offenders](#)" offer job training, career counseling and educational services in settings such as halfway houses and group homes. Assistance is hands-on and can include resume preparation and coaching for job interviews. Alas, a review of ten programs concluded that their participants were just as likely to be re-arrested or convicted or commit a release violation as probationers and parolees who didn't take part.

Glancing at the scorecards, we noticed that only a measly eight percent of practices and five percent of programs got NIJ's "effective" nod. Even then, there seems to be pitifully little to brag about. Consider the well-regarded Boston program. While the difference between clients' 77.8 percent re-arrest rate and the comparison group's 87.7 percent rate may be statistically significant, its real-world implications are less than compelling. Even so, the program's academic evaluators seemed highly impressed. Here

are their journal article's ("[Controlling Violent Offenders Released to the Community: An Evaluation of the Boston Reentry Initiative](#)") final words:


...these findings suggest that individualized treatment plans, facilitated by mentors and supported by a network of criminal justice, social service, and community-based organizations, can positively affect gang-involved offenders returning to high-risk communities. Effective gang violence prevention policy should focus on developing programs that facilitate prosocial transitions for gang-involved inmates after release from incarceration.

As bad old "police science and administration" (your blogger's undergrad major) gave way to the modern disciplines of criminal justice and criminology, university programs began looking on policing – indeed, all forms of social control – far more skeptically. Consider, for example, [a recent lead story](#) in John Jay college's *The Crime Report*, "Why Re-Arrest Doesn't Mean You're a Failure." Its source, [an extensive essay](#) by Professor Cecelia M. Klingele in the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, argues that re-arrest is a poor proxy of recidivism, as it fails to consider positive "life changes" and unspecified "nuances" that would yield a more accurate assessment of desistance from crime. (And, one might assume, a far more upbeat one as well.)

While fine-tuning our measurement tools might yield some benefits, all this newfangled sophistication threatens to distract us from the reason we bothered in the first place. Whether recidivism stands at 77.8 or 87.7 percent, it's flesh-and-blood people who pay the price. Powerful real-world examples of the human costs of crime, such as those that kicked off this essay, feed the fire of advocacy groups positioned well to the right of *The Crime Report*. Say, [The Manhattan Institute](#). Its recent missive, "[Issues 2020: Mass Decarceration Will Increase Violent Crime](#)," uses arrest, sentencing and reoffending data to argue that "given the extremely high rates of recidivism," backing off on imprisonment can only lead to more suffering.

Consider the story of [Shomari Legghette](#). Thanks to his early release from prison, the four-time loser with convictions for armed robbery, guns, drugs and assault was running loose on Chicago's streets. On February 13, 2019 he was approached by officers who wanted to question him about some recent gunplay. Legghette ran off, and when confronted by police commander Paul Bauer, who happened to be nearby, the forty-four year old chronic offender pulled a gun and repeatedly fired, inflicting fatal wounds. (For an account of Leggett's troubled life – in his own words, no less – click [here](#).)

Full stop. Let's look at some numbers. This graph uses [LAPD's UCR data](#) to depict the city's violent crime trend from 2010 thru 2018, the latest full year available:



“[The Blame Game](#)” mentions three key easings during this period: a 2011 act ([AB 109](#), the “Public Safety Realignment Act”) that shifted confinement and supervision of “non-serious, non-violent” felons from state prisons and parole agents to county jails and probation officers; Proposition 47, a 2014 measure that reduced many felonies to misdemeanors; and, two years later, Proposition 57, which reduced sentences and facilitated early parole.

What caused the sharp, post-2013 uptick? [Cops](#), [prosecutors](#) and the [state peace officer’s association](#) would say: “all three.” Their angst isn’t purely based on numbers. Consider, for example, Michael Mejia. After doing three years for robbery, the 26-year old Southern California resident was arrested for grand theft auto and served another two years. After his release he committed a string of violations. In the old days Mejia would have been returned to prison, but thanks to A.B. 109 he merely landed in county jail, and for brief periods, at that. On February 20, 2017 [Mejia gunned down his cousin](#) and stole a car. He then shot and killed veteran Whittier, Calif. police officer Keith Boyer and seriously wounded his partner.

Whittier’s grieving chief and the L.A. County Sheriff [laid blame on California’s legal retrenchments](#). Sheriff Jim McDonnell complained that his jails had become a “default state prison” and that thanks to the letup, “we’re putting people back on the street that aren’t ready to be back on the street.”

Not everyone sees it that way. According to the liberally-inclined [Public Policy Institute of California](#), the uptick in violence [was already in progress](#) when Proposition

47, which it supports, came to be. That view [was supported by researchers](#) at UCI's School of Social Ecology, who found no difference when comparing 2015 crime rates between California and "synthetic" equivalent states with like demographics but no changes in the laws. (Yes, that's 2015 only.) Punching back, a conservative Oakland-based group, the [Independent Institute](#), pointed out that property crimes such as car burglaries [also surged](#) after Prop. 47 took effect. In June 2018, the Public Policy Institute [partly conceded](#). Yes, early releases may have somewhat increased offending, but only of the "property" kind. As for the spike in violence, that's an artifact of changes in crime defining and reporting. And don't fret, they added: recidivism is on the way down.

We'll wait while the blues and the reds duke it out. And keep an ear to what's happening in New York. On January 1st. [a bail reform law went into effect](#), eliminating cash bail for misdemeanors and "non-violent" felonies, including some robberies and burglaries. That's led to the release of many arrestees pending trial and, as the *New York Times* [recently reported](#), is putting authorities "on edge":

A few liberal prosecutors, including the Brooklyn district attorney, Eric Gonzalez, have embraced the changes, pointing to states that saw lower crime rates after they eliminated cash bail. But many prosecutors and police officials worry that some defendants released under the new rules will continue to commit crimes....

Really.

Posted 10/25/14

REWARDING THE NAUGHTY

A California ballot measure would reduce many felonies to misdemeanors

By Julius (Jay) Wachtel. According to its proponents, California Proposition 47, enticingly entitled “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,” will *increase* public safety by *reducing* punishment. This extract from arguments in favor of the measure explains how its seemingly counterintuitive approach will work:

- **Prioritizes Serious and Violent Crime:** Stops wasting prison space on petty crimes and focuses law enforcement resources on violent and serious crime by changing low-level nonviolent crimes such as simple drug possession and petty theft from felonies to misdemeanors.
- **Keeps Dangerous Criminals Locked Up:** Authorizes felonies for registered sex offenders and anyone with a prior conviction for rape, murder or child molestation.
- **Saves Hundreds of Millions of Dollars:** Stops wasting money on warehousing people in prisons for nonviolent petty crimes, saving hundreds of millions of taxpayer funds every year.
- **Funds Schools and Crime Prevention:** Dedicates the massive savings to crime prevention strategies in K–12 schools, assistance for victims of crime, and mental health treatment and drug treatment to stop the cycle of crime.

Proposition 47 reduces penalties from felonies to misdemeanors for six “non-serious, nonviolent” crimes which, depending on severity and the offender’s prior record, can presently be charged as felonies. Five – grand theft, shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, and check forgery – would only be chargeable as misdemeanors as long as the loss is \$950 or less. Possession of illegal drugs would also be a mandatory misdemeanor (the change would not affect marijuana possession, already a petty offense.) Persons already serving felony sentences for such convictions would be eligible for resentencing and early release from custody or supervision. To provide reassurance, the measure explicitly forbids giving breaks to persons who have been convicted of murder, rape and child molestation.

There are influential voices on both sides. The measure’s sponsors include the current San Francisco D.A. and the former police chief of San Diego. Opponents include the presidents of the California Police Chiefs Association and the California District Attorneys Association. One of the big quarrels is over the consequences of releasing as

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many as 10,000 prisoners should the initiative pass. Opponents claim it could cause a public safety disaster. Proponents say not to worry, as the text of the proposed law forbids resentencing prisoners whose criminal record suggests they present an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”

Exactly what does “unreasonable risk” mean? Section 14 of the measure defines it as a prior conviction for an offense enumerated in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(c)(iv). Here is the subsection in full:

(I) A "sexually violent offense" as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

(II) Oral copulation with a child who is under 14 years of age, and who is more than 10 years younger than he or she as defined by Section 288a, sodomy with another person who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than he or she as defined by Section 286, or sexual penetration with another person who is under 14 years of age, and who is more than 10 years younger than he or she, as defined by Section 289.

(III) A lewd or lascivious act involving a child under 14 years of age, in violation of Section 288.

(IV) Any homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive.

(V) Solicitation to commit murder as defined in Section 653f.

(VI) Assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or firefighter, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (d) of Section 245.

(VII) Possession of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 11418.

(VIII) Any serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.

Senator Diane Feinstein, an avowed liberal who opposes the measure, pointed out that serious crimes such as burglary, armed robbery and aggravated assault are not on the list. Accordingly, should Proposition 47 pass, persons with prior convictions for such crimes would indeed be eligible for early release.

Proposition 47 may also reward the wrong people. According to the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst, nearly all offenders who stand to gain from the proposition received prison terms not because of what they actually did, but due to their prior record:

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A relatively small portion—about one-tenth—of offenders of the above crimes are currently sent to state prison (generally, because they had a prior serious or violent conviction). Under this measure, none of these offenders would be sent to state prison. Instead, they would serve lesser sentences at the county level.

Another concern relates to negotiated pleas, which account for at least ninety percent of adjudications. For example, burglars frequently plead to grand theft, and dope dealers to drug possession. If Proposition 47 passes many defendants stand to benefit twice: first from a plea deal, then from mandatory misdemeanor sentencing. (Our system's dependence on plea deals makes withholding them highly unlikely.)

Recalibrating punishment may be a good idea. But if the measure's objective is to improve public safety, offender criminal histories must not be glossed over or, even worse, ignored. Neither should the proposition become an invitation to keep committing "minor" crimes. Under Proposition 47 stealing an object valued at \$950 or less – say, an iPad, or an iPhone – is a misdemeanor, period. That's true even if the thief is a repeat offender or has a prior conviction for, say, burglary, armed robbery or grand theft. Indeed, Proposition 47 seems almost an invitation for pickpockets, shoplifters and common thieves to go "pro."

Imprisonment is a crude tool, but it works, if only by incapacitating offenders so they cannot strike while locked up. We might hate to admit it, but incarceration undoubtedly helped break the crime wave of the 80s and early 90s. Now that society seems eager to ease up, it must be done transparently, based on relevant and clearly articulated criteria. Efforts such as Proposition 47, which tinker with a ridiculously complex system (read the initiative, and be sure to have aspirin on hand) are likely to be ineffective, with consequences that we will all regret.

Posted 9/4/18

THE BAIL CONUNDRUM

Bail obviously disadvantages the poor. What are the alternatives?

By Julius (Jay) Wachtel. On September 19, 2017 Mickey Rivera walked out of jail, a free man. [Well, relatively free](#). Unable to post \$35,000 bail, he had been locked up for more than two years awaiting trial for his role in the [2015 gang-related killing](#) of a Boston man. In August 2017, though, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in [Brangan v. Commonwealth](#), an unrelated case, that absent specifically documented reasons, cash bail must not outstrip a defendant's ability to pay. After all, bail isn't intended as punishment but "to provide the necessary security for [a defendant's] appearance at trial." Given that decision, Rivera's lawyers appealed. Despite his substantial criminal record, Rivera's bail was reduced to \$1,000. He paid up, was outfitted with a tracking device and let go. That, a legal expert told the Boston Globe, was perfectly appropriate:

Nancy Gertner, a retired federal judge and a senior lecturer at Harvard Law School, defended McGuire's decision to reduce bail, saying he was following a state court decision that is part of a national bail reform effort to prevent people from being jailed before trial simply because they are poor. "What the judge did is exactly right," Gertner said.

Real life tends to muddy things, and this case is no exception. In June 2018, nine months after being set loose, Rivera was arrested for drunk driving. Although he was still awaiting a criminal trial, Rivera was released without bail (his driver license was suspended.) One month later, on July 28, Massachusetts cops observed him [speeding and driving erratically](#). Rivera took off, with cops in pursuit. The chase ended when Rivera slammed head-on into another vehicle, killing a man who had just visited his wife and newborn daughter in the hospital. Rivera was also killed, and a passenger in his vehicle died the following day.

As one might expect, Rivera's case led to considerable recrimination and finger-pointing. Lots of criticism was directed at the judges who reduced Rivera's bail in the killing to a token amount and, much later, let him walk on the DUI. Both were blamed for not making the effort to articulate the need to set a substantial bail amount, even beyond Rivera's ability to pay, as state law and the court decision allow. Of course, the judges had a built-in excuse: despite his many run-ins with the police, Rivera had always shown up.

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Showing up? Is that what bail is all about? Apparently, the answer is yes. Bail's only mention in the Constitution is in the [Eight Amendment](#), which stipulates that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." While these few words don't address bail's purpose, [Stack v. Boyle](#) (342 U.S. 1, 1951), the leading Supreme Court case on point, prohibits setting bail "at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill the purpose of assuring the presence of the defendant...." Here is how Justice Robert H. Jackson suggested that be determined:

Each accused is entitled to any benefits due to his good record, and misdeeds or a bad record should prejudice only those who are guilty of them. The question when application for bail is made relates to each one's trustworthiness to appear for trial and what security will supply reasonable assurance of his appearance...This is not to say that every defendant is entitled to such bail as he can provide, but he is entitled to an opportunity to make it in a reasonable amount.

Wait a minute. Doesn't a suspect's dangerousness also matter? Unfortunately, the underlying offense in Doyle was nonviolent so that concern didn't come up. For a clue we return to Brangan, the Massachusetts case. There the crime was armed robbery, so the justices had no option but to address dangerousness. And their answer, as far as bail is concerned, was "no":

...a judge may not consider a defendant's alleged dangerousness in setting the amount of bail, although a defendant's dangerousness may be considered as a factor in setting other conditions of release. Using unattainable bail to detain a defendant because he is dangerous is improper....(emphasis ours)

That doesn't mean that the nature of a crime is irrelevant. After all, serious crimes carry serious punishment, and that might make an accused more likely to flee. In fact, Brangan and its precedents require that factors such as the nature of an offense, community ties, mental condition, criminal record and failures to appear (FTA) be considered when setting bail, but only to evaluate the risk of flight. And there are limits. After all, bail inherently discriminates against the poor. Here's another extract from *Brangan*:

A bail that is set without any regard to whether a defendant is a pauper or a plutocrat runs the risk of being excessive and unfair. A \$250 cash bail will have little impact on the well-to-do, for whom it is less than the cost of a night's stay in a downtown Boston hotel, but it will probably result in detention for a homeless person whose entire earthly belongings can be carried in a cart.

That argument parallels the views of justice activists who have called for the elimination of bail altogether. Here, for example, is an extract from the [ACLU “Smart Justice” website](#):

...bail was supposed to make sure people return to court to face charges against them. But instead, the money bail system has morphed into widespread wealth-based incarceration. Poorer Americans and people of color often can’t afford to come up with money for bail, leaving them stuck in jail awaiting trial, sometimes for months or years. Meanwhile, wealthy people accused of the same crime can buy their freedom and return home.

By design, offense severity and prior record strongly influence bail setting and pretrial detention. Research has also revealed that in comparison to white arrestees, blacks and Hispanics are less able to afford bail and less likely to be released without posting bail, thus more likely to remain in pretrial custody. For example, see “[Sentenced to Pretrial Detention: A Study of Bail Decisions and Outcomes](#)” (a review of recent New Jersey data) and “[Recommended for release on recognizance: Factors affecting pretrial release recommendations](#)” (an earlier review in Toledo.)

Concerns about extralegal disparities led New Jersey to implement a [statewide “risk assessment” system](#) in 2017. Pre-trial investigators collect information to help courts determine whether releasing defendants through “non-monetary means” would unduly risk their flight or imperil public safety. Cash bail remains an option but its use is heavily discouraged. As one might expect, [the bail industry balked](#). So far, though, the statute [has survived legal challenges](#).

Determined not to be left out, liberal-minded California recently enacted an [even more sweeping measure](#) that, as of October 2019, does away with bail altogether. Other than under exceptional circumstances, persons arrested for misdemeanors will be summarily released. Like in New Jersey, arrestees charged with more serious crimes would be evaluated by pretrial services, which could release those who pose a low-to-moderate risk to public safety or of nonappearance. Other defendants could thereafter be released by the courts, which could impose only non-monetary conditions. Characters who seems so likely to flee, or pose such an extreme threat to public safety that releasing them under any conditions seems unwise, would be subject to [preventive detention](#). As one would expect, this involves substantial due-process safeguards, including a hearing. Other states (e.g., [New Jersey](#), [Massachusetts](#)) have similar provisions.

One might think that minimizing the use of bail or, as in California, eliminating it altogether would satisfy activists. But according to [a recent article in Politico](#) one would

be wrong: “Social justice advocates that had once championed the initiative to abolish cash bail mobilized against the final iteration of the [California] bill, which they saw as having morphed from righteous to dangerous.” What’s so “dangerous” about risk assessment and, as a last resort, preventive detention? Given the presumption of innocence, apparently everything: “In critics’ eyes, that means California will continue to give local judges the sweeping authority to keep people incarcerated before they’re convicted of anything.” Similar concerns have arisen [in New Jersey](#) and elsewhere.

Law enforcement officers must deal with the consequences of poor release decisions, so they usually favor a short leash. Four months after New Jersey’s provisions took effect, Jules Black, an ex-con, was arrested for having a gun. Assessed as low-risk, [he was released without bail](#). Within hours Black allegedly cornered one of his enemies and shot him dead. According to a local jailer (he’s also president of the police union) career criminals are taking advantage of the reforms: “I’m seeing the same exact people every week. I’m just seeing them come in with new charges. It’s more work for officers. It’s a lot more work for them.” Concerns that the new procedures were proving too lax were seconded in an [NorthJersey.com editorial](#):

In particular, officers say the new law’s risk assessment, or Public Safety Assessment, leaves too much to chance and is allowing, in some instances, violent-prone individuals to be back out on the street shortly after their court appearances. This, they say, is also bringing more pressure and stress to officers on patrol.

Is assessment a solution? Newfangled protocols supposedly let authorities assign applicants for release to the appropriate risk pool. To be sure, paying specialists to make distinctions will produce...distinctions. But whether these yield groups with markedly different, real-world propensities to engage in misconduct is something else altogether.

Neither is bail a guarantor of good outcomes. “Googling” instantly turned up a recent, troubling anecdote. On May 13, a Wisconsin man with an extensive criminal record that includes “bail jumping” was out on \$7,500 cash bond for a string of crimes when an officer [tried to pull him over for a traffic violation](#). After a pursuit (a cop wound up getting dragged a short distance by the suspect’s car) the man was arrested on multiple charges.

This time he was detained without bail, right? Wrong. Cash bond was set at \$1,000.

Pre-trial release, on bail and otherwise, is ubiquitous and surprisingly permissive. [A recent study](#) of eleven major California counties tracked more than one and one-half million bookings (1,563,837) between October 2011 and October 2015. Forty-one


percent of the arrestees were released before trial, split about 60/40 percent between misdemeanors and felonies. Of these, a bit more than a quarter (27.8 percent) had to post bail, most often for a felony offense. About seven percent of the bookings (112,445) were for FTA on a prior charge. Thirty-eight percent of these defendants (43,029) were again let go. [A previous study](#), of persons released from Dallas County jail in 2008, suggested that failure to appear is frequent. Including misdemeanors and felonies, [the rate ranged](#) from 23 percent of those released on bail to 39 percent of those who were simply cleared by pretrial services (N=29,416). Another, [“An Experiment in the Law: Studying a Technique to Reduce Failure to Appear in Court,”](#) about individuals released on misdemeanor charges in Nebraska during 2009-10, yielded a control group FTA rate of 12.6 percent (N=7,865).

FTA isn't the only issue. Released persons must often comply with other conditions; for example, wear an ankle monitor, keep away from certain persons and places, and so on. But public safety agencies have limited resources, and their practitioners can only do so much. Whether it's old-fashioned cash bail or a newfangled assessment, the sheer magnitude of pre-trial release, the uncertainties of evaluating applicants, and the frailties of human nature inevitably create error, and along with it a substantial threat to the public and police. At a certain point – and from the flub-ups, we've probably reached it – trying to fine-tune outcomes becomes an exercise in wishful thinking. Release more, and there will be more news headlines and more cause for essays like this. That's the one certainty we'll never escape.

Posted 5/21/18

THE BLAME GAME

***Inmates are “realigned” from state to county supervision.
Then a cop gets killed.***



By Julius (Jay) Wachtel. Cops would worry less if their workplace was more forgiving. But it's not. Legal rules and enforcement practices often seem out of sync with the “real world.” There are never enough resources to consistently do a good job. Accurate information is frequently lacking, and there is often little chance to seek it out. Citizens and suspects are unpredictable and dangerous. That's why cops want evildoers behind bars. *Big bars.* Throw away the key: problem solved.

What officers want isn't necessarily what they get. California's cops got their first taste of the “new normal” in 2011. Two years after Federal judges [imposed a cap](#) on the state's overflowing prisons, legislators passed AB 109, the “[Public Safety Realignment Act](#),” shifting confinement and post-release supervision of “non-serious, non-violent [and] non-sex” offenders from state prisons to county jails and probation departments. Three years later [Proposition 47](#) reduced many felony drug crimes and all theft and stolen property cases with losses under \$950 to misdemeanors. And two years after that, [Proposition 57](#), the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016,” made it easier for inmates to earn release credits and for “nonviolent” offenders sentenced on multiple charges to win early parole.

Prosecutors and police opposed “realigning” prisoner populations and facilitating early release. They lost. After all, weren't crime rates way down from their peaks? With

reformers howling and politicians reluctant to pay for more prisons, all three measures remain on the books.

No, the sky hasn't fallen. But change always carries consequences. During the first year of realignment, as the state prison population [dropped by twenty-six thousand](#), jail populations surged by over 8,500. County lockups were quickly swamped, [forcing authorities to release arrestees](#) whom police wanted to keep in custody. Sentences were waived or cut short, and parolees whose supervision was shifted to the counties remained on the streets despite repeated violations. One, Sidney DeAvila, a sex offender, used his freedom to rape and murder his grandmother and cut her into pieces. A Democratic legislator bemoaned things. "It's justice by Nerf ball. We designed a system that doesn't work."

The above graph is from [FBI data](#). While the nation's violent crime rate remained fairly steady between 2011-2016 (it fell two-tenths of one percent, from 387.1 to 386.3), California's violent crime rate climbed 7.7 percent, from 411.1 to 445.3

In late 2016, with violent crime in California up for a third consecutive year, [a columnist for the Sacramento Bee](#), the newspaper serving the state capital, wondered "whether releasing tens of thousands of criminals who otherwise would have been behind bars is having a negative effect." His concern paralleled those of the public safety community, which was convinced that re-alignment was at fault for the increase.

Not everyone was so pessimistic. A [September 2016 report](#) by the [Center on Criminal and Juvenile Justice](#) (its mission is "to reduce society's reliance on incarceration as a solution to social problems") examined whether realignment contributed to the uptick in crime during 2014-15. Conceding that there was a lot of variation in the data, and that some counties did go the other way, investigators concluded that reducing the number of persons in jail did not cause the overall increase in crime.

In the same month, the influential [Public Policy Institute of California](#) used two-year old (2014) crime data [to conclude that realignment was a success](#). (However, it did note that preliminary 2015 statistics were somewhat troubling.) One year later the institute [conceded that](#) realignment "had modest [adverse] effects on recidivism"; particularly, that parolees whose sentences were cut short and had their supervision turned over to county probation officers were more likely to reoffend.

That's what happened with [Michael Mejia](#). After serving a three-year prison term for a 2010 robbery, the heavily tattooed Los Angeles gang member [stole a car and got two years for auto theft](#). Thanks to [AB 109](#), he was released early, in April 2016, into the supervision of a local P.O. [Mejia promptly amassed a string of violations](#) and served

brief stretches in jail. On February 20, 2017, nine days after his last release, he went off the deep end. [Mejia murdered a cousin](#), stole a car, and when confronted chose to shoot it out, killing Whittier, Calif. officer Keith Boyer and seriously wounding his partner.

Mejia's foul deed energized anti-realignment forces. [A coalition](#) of police organizations, prosecutors and victims' rights groups is presently seeking to place the "[Reducing Crime and Keeping California Safe Act of 2018](#)," an initiative that substantially rolls back the provisions of AB 109 and Propositions 47 and 57, on the November ballot.

Meanwhile, pro-realignment forces have pulled out all the stops. [The Marshall Project](#), a "nonpartisan, nonprofit news organization that seeks to create and sustain a sense of national urgency about the U.S. criminal justice system" and the *Los Angeles Times* recently released an analysis that blames officer Boyer's death on judges and probation staff who mistakenly let Mejia into the program, then gave him too many breaks. (Click [here](#) and [here](#).)

We won't parse the arguments pro and con in detail. What strikes us, though, is just how much is expected from those who must implement realignment's provisions in the "real world." The Marshall Project and *Times* insist (of course, with the benefit of hindsight) that Mejia's poor conduct while under supervision [required that his probation be revoked](#). But had they reviewed the innumerable examples of probation supervision that *don't* end with the killing of a police officer, they would have discovered that Mejia's behavior, which lacked "red flags" such as weapons or violence, was really quite ordinary.

In brief, he was your typical no-goodnik – until he wasn't.

That's not to say that Mejia *should* have been on the street. Still, if all who behaved similarly were reincarcerated, the correctional system would collapse. With confinement out of favor, prisons at capacity and local resources hard-pressed, thanks in part to realignment, prosecutors, P.O.'s and judges are under immense pressure to keep no-goodniks on the street. While that's not what cops would prefer, they're not calling the shots. At least, not until November.